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KUNG-CHUNG LIU* AND SHUFENG ZHENG**
Asian IP Law: An Area of Rising Importance
Intellectual property (IP) laws are an important instrument for promoting cooperation and peace in Asia. In their own
ways, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and India all serve as IP success stories. Structural features of
the IP landscape in major Asian jurisdictions include the following: technocrat-driven IP law, national IP strategies and
specialized IP or patent judges. In addition, there are five distinctively Asian developments worth noticing: the sweeping
criminalization of copyright infringement, an explosion in the number of registered trademarks, the very limited use of
compulsory patent licensing and the convergence on certain standards for the licensing of standard essential patents
(SEPs). On the other hand, it is notable that an open-ended and general fair use clause has had a mixed reception in
Asian copyright and trademark law. Finding ways to enhance cooperation across Asia, steering IP regimes through trade
deals and free trade agreements (FTAs), envisioning a fairer (or at least more functional) mechanism for paying creators,
and improving the quality and performance of IP or patent judges are among the important issues that need addressing
in the continuing effort to leverage IP laws as a tool for prosperity and peace in Asia.
I. Introduction
Asia is an essential piece to the global puzzle of IP law.
The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition has long recognized the need to understand
Asian IP law. Since its first studies in the 1990s, the
Institute has published 17 volumes on the subject in its
Series on Asian Intellectual Property Law.1 There is never-
theless a shortage of literature that looks at Asian IP law
across all the major Asian jurisdictions and a surprising
dearth of Asian-centric literature on IP law written
by Asians.
Of course, no single article can claim to cover Asian IP
law in a comprehensive way. Therefore, this article has
the more prosaic aim of (1) identifying the importance of
Asia and some of its peculiarities, (2) laying out some
structural features of the IP landscape in major Asian
jurisdictions, (3) highlighting some distinctively Asian
developments, and (4) identifying important issues to be
addressed in the future. In short, this article provides a
general picture rather than a critical analysis of any spe-
cific IP questions in Asia.
II. The importance of Asia and some of its
peculiarities
1. Colonization by European powers and Japan
in the modern age
Asia is located primarily in the eastern and northern
hemispheres. It is the largest and most populous conti-
nent, comprising roughly 60% of the world’s population
(4.6 billion people as of July 2019)2 and 30% of Earth’s
land area.3 The modern age in Asia was ushered in by
sweeping colonization by European powers in the 19th
century, with only Bhutan, China, Japan, Nepal and
Thailand (Siam) remaining independent states.
Partly propelled by its embrace of a patent system,
Japan quickly rose to world power in the late 19th cen-
tury.4 At first, its rise was welcomed by Asians as a sign
of hope for liberation from European colonizers.
However, this hope soon turned out to be an illusion,
as Japan also adopted a colonization policy. It first
colonized Taiwan in 18955 and then Korea in
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1 Christopher Heath, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Asia – An
Overview’ 28 (3) IIC 303-309 (1997). Heath’s seven-page article was a
bit too concise to cover twelve jurisdictions. As a follow-up, a special is-
sue on Intellectual Property Rights in Asia II was published in 30 (4) IIC
(1999). Shortly thereafter, the Max Planck Series on Asian Intellectual
Property Law was launched.
2 See the population statistics at <https://www.worldometers.info/
world-population/>. Asia has historically been home to the bulk of the
planet`s population. According to the report from United Nations
Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘The
World at Six Billion’ <https://mysite.du.edu/rkuhn/ints4465/world-at-
six-billion.pdf> 4, the world population in 1750 was 791 million, with
64% in Asia.
3 Asia covers an area of 44,579,000 square kilometres and Earth’s total
land area is around 148,300,000 square kilometres. In this article we do
not include Australia and New Zealand as parts of Asia, nor do we deal
with the broadly termed Asia-Pacific countries.
4 Under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which
was signed in 1894 and took effect in July 1899, Britain gave up extrater-
ritorial rights in Japan. An alliance with the United Kingdom in 1902
established Japan as an international power. (For more on the Japanese-
British alliance, see Phillips O’Brien, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-
1922 (Routledge 2004)).
5 According to arts 1 and 2 of the Shimonoseki Treaty, which followed
China’s defeat to Japan in 1895, China lost its suzerainty of Korea and
Taiwan was ceded to Japan, making it the first Japanese colony.
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1910.6 Japan invaded China in 1931 and occupied South
East Asia (SEA) from 1941 onwards until it surrendered
unconditionally in 1945. The history of colonization and
war continues to have a huge impact on Asia.
2. Underlying tensions after World War II
Communist expansion in China, Korea, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos after World War II (WWII)7 foiled
genuine Asian reconciliation, which would have required
long-term efforts above and beyond the Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal.8 The US hurriedly formed a front with
Japan, Korea, Taiwan (which was returned to the
Republic of China) and Vietnam to control the spread
of communism.
After supporting the North Koreans in the Korean War
in the 1950s (with the US supporting the South Koreans),
Communist China had military conflicts with Taiwan,
the Soviet Union and India in the 1950s-1960s and
‘punished’ Vietnam in 1979.9 Vietnam had its own mili-
tary conflict with Cambodia.10 In addition, four wars
broke out in South Asia between India and Pakistan in
1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999,11 with lingering territorial
skirmishes between the two rivals. Today, Japan has terri-
torial disputes with Korea, Russia, China and Taiwan,
while China has similar issues with India, Japan,
Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan. 12 To make things
worse, under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, North Korea
has repeatedly provoked the US, Japan and South Korea
by firing missiles.13
3. The least integrated of all continents
In terms of integration, the past few centuries of Asian
history have left the continent in a difficult situation, de-
spite a short-lived attempt at Pan-Asianism advocated by
An Jung-geun（安重根) in 1910.14 As a result, there is
simply a lack of truly Asian institutions which can medi-
ate Asian integration. The two ‘Asian’ institutions that do
exist are not truly Asian and have limited coverage: the
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 1966), dominated by
Japan and the US,15 and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB, 2015),16 dominated by China.17
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
with 10 members,18 has been a soft institution for SEA
specifically (rather than Asia at large) since its inception
in 1967, as it follows ‘a process of regional interactions
and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, con-
sensus building and non-confrontational bargaining
styles’.19 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC,
founded in 1989, with 21 member states),20 the
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP)21 and the impending Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP)22 are not ‘purely’ Asian,
although the majority of their members are from Asia.
For sure, Asia is the least integrated of all continents. In
other words, there is no Asian institution that serves as a
venue for Asian economies to sit down and amicably set-
tle their differences. Asia is still absorbed in the struggle
to overcome historical hatred and distrust. The recent
trade and security brawl between South Korea and Japan
triggered by the Korean Supreme Court’s decision on
compensation for Koreans who were forced to work by
6 Korea became a protectorate of Japan with the Japan-Korea Treaty of
1905; it was then de jure annexed to Japan with the Japan-Korea Treaty
of 1910; see <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/08/29/editori
als/the-annexation-of-korea/#.XT3PtPZuKXY>.
7 Donald Zagoria, ‘Communism in Asia’ (1965) Commentary <https://
www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/communism-in-asia>.
8 According to Motoko Rich, ‘Survival of the Throne: Episode One –
Japan Would Make Akihito Emperor, but She Called Him “Jimmy”’ The
New York Times (New York, 29 April 2019) <https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/04/29/world/asia/emperor-akihito.html>, ‘In the US and other
Allied nations, pressure mounted for Hirohito to be indicted as a war
criminal. MacArthur had other ideas and decided to spare Hirohito –
and to use him. With a presidential run in mind, MacArthur saw the em-
peror as a key to demilitarizing Japan and remaking it as a democratic
nation.’ According to John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the
Wake of World War II (1st ed, W.W. Norton & Company/New Press
1999) 326, ‘with the full support of MacArthur's headquarters, the pros-
ecution functioned, in effect, as a defense team for the emperor.’ Herbert
Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (Harper Perennial 2000)
583 and 585, ‘MacArthur's truly extraordinary measures to save
Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly dis-
torting impact on the Japanese understanding of the lost war.’
9 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-1955) and the Second Taiwan
Strait Crisis (1996), the Zhenbao Island Incident (1969) between China
and the Soviet Union, the Sino-India War in 1962, the Battle of the
Paracel Islands (1974) between China and South Vietnam, and the Sino-
Vietnamese War (1979).
10 The Cambodian-Vietnamese war was between 1975 and 1978.
11 The violent partition of British India in 1947; the Indo-Pakistani War
of 1965 following Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar, designed to infiltrate
Jammu and Kashmir to prevent rule by India; the Bangladesh Liberation
War of 1971; and the Kargil War in 1999.
12 Takeshima Island is claimed by both Japan and South Korea. The
South Kuril Islands are claimed by both Russia and Japan. Areas in
Aksai Chin and Nepal are disputed by China and India. The Paracel
Islands (Xisha), controlled by China, are also claimed by Vietnam and
Taiwan. Scarborough Shoal is claimed both by China and the
Philippines. India and Pakistan both claim sovereignty over the former
independent princely states of Jammu and Kashmir.
13 Yongho Kim, ‘North Korea’s Threat Perception and Provocation
Under Kim Jong-un: The Security Dilemma and the Obsession with
Political Survival’ 9 (1) North Korean Review 6-19 (2013).
14 An Jung-geun was a Korean independence activist before Japan
annexed Korea and assassinated Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文), four-time
prime minister (the 1st, 5th, 7th and 10th) and resident-general of Korea,
at the Harbin Railway Station in China on 26 October 1909; he was later
executed. An Jung-geun, ‘On Peace in East Asia ( )’ foresaw a
union of the three East Asian nations of China, Japan and Korea with
combined armed forces and joint banknotes in order to fight off
European colonialism. See generally also Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic
Nationalism in Korea (Stanford University Press 2006).
15 The ADB was set up on 19 December 1996 with 31 members in
Manila. As of 31 December 2018, Japan and the US together subscribed
15.571% of the total capital and enjoyed 12.756% of the voting power,
making them the most powerful members in the ADB. See ADB, ‘Annual
report 2018 – Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power’ (ADB, Asian
Development Bank, April 2019) <https://www.adb.org/documents/adb-
annual-report-2018>.
16 Representatives from 57 Prospective Founding Members of the AIIB
signed the Bank’s Articles of Agreement in 2015; see <https://www.aiib.
org/en/news-events/news/2015/20150629_001.html>.
17 As of 13 July 2019, China subscribed USD 29.78 billion of the AIIB’s
total subscription, or 30.8913%, and enjoys 26.6576% of the total vot-
ing power, making it the most powerful AIIB member; see <https://www.
aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html>.
18 ASEAN’s members include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam. See <https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states>.
19 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast
Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (2nd ed, Routledge
2009) 64, cited in Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs, ‘Is ASEAN
Powerful? Neo-realist versus constructivist approaches to power in
Southeast Asia’ 19 (2) The Pacific Review 135 and 138 (2016).
20 Introduction of the APEC <www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC>.
21 The CPTPP is a free trade agreement (FTA) among eleven countries,
which are all members of the APEC. See <https://www.mti.gov.sg/en/
Improving-Trade/Free-Trade-Agreements/CPTPP>.
22 The RCEP was built on the ASEAN members and five ASEAN-FTA
partners (Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). See
<https://asean.org/?static_post¼rcep-regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership>. 15 member countries have decided to sign RCEP on 13
March 2020; see <https://theprint.in/economy/with-or-without-india-15-
member-countries-decide-to-sign-rcep-on-13-march/332620/>.
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Japanese enterprises during WWII is just one vivid exam-
ple.23 Confronted with this, Asian people should work to-
gether to find ways to enhance regional cooperation and
stability. To further these goals, much can and must be
done in the IP field. This would be less politically sensitive
and of greater mutual benefit if done in a balanced way.
Cooperation in IP areas among Asian economies would
not only be conducive to the future prosperity of Asia but
also contribute to lasting peace on the continent.
4. Many IP success stories in Asia
The first IP laws in Asia were mostly imposed by foreign
powers, with the exception of Japan, which willingly em-
braced patents in 1871 to boost national development.24
The direct imposition of IP laws to protect European
interests in Asian colonies was common practice, such as
in India,25 Singapore26 and Indonesia.27 Under pressure
from the European powers, China started to draft copy-
right and trademark laws in the final years of the late
Qing dynasty.28 Most newly independent Asian nations
after WWII adopted their versions of IP laws under trade
pressure from the US after the 1980s.29 IP success stories
include Japan in the 1960s-1970s,30 Korea and Taiwan in
the 1990s,31 Hong Kong and Singapore after 2000,32 and
23 In 2018, South Korea’s Supreme Court ordered certain Japanese
firms to compensate Korean forced laborers during World War II. In
2019, Korean courts further approved the seizure of assets from
Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp. and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Ltd. in January and March, respectively. In protest, Japan
placed export restrictions on chemicals and other materials that South
Korea’s tech industry needs to produce semiconductors and smart
phone screens. In August 2019, Japan and Korea each successively ex-
cluded the other from its own trade white list. For relevant news
reports, see ‘Mitsubishi Heavy ordered to compensate forced S Korean
war workers’ (BBC News, 29 November 2018) <https://www.bbc.
com/news/business-46381207>; Kyodo, ‘South Korea court approves
seizure of Mitsubishi Heavy trademarks and patents over wartime
forced labour’ (Japan Times, 25 March 2019) <https://www.japan
times.co.jp/news/2019/03/25/national/south-korea-court-approves-sei
zure-mitsubishi-heavy-assets-wartime-labor/#.XUppOOgza1s>;
Joohee Cho, ‘Japan removes South Korea from trade ‘whitelist’’(abc
News, 2 August 2019) <https://abcnews.go.com/International/japan-
removes-south-korea-trade-white-list/story?id¼64728582>.
24 In 1871, Japan attempted to establish a patent system by temporarily
implementing Senbai Ryaku Kisoku (Summary of Rules on Sales
Monopoly), a set of 19 provisions that granted a monopoly right over ev-
ery new invention, but it was abrogated the next year. Paul Goldstein
and Joseph Straus, Intellectual Property in Asia: Law, Economics,
History and Politics (Springer 2009) 132; Christopher Heath (ed),
Intellectual Property Law in Asia (Kluwer Law International 2002) 305.
25 The Indian Literary Copyright Act of 1847, Patent Act No 15 of 1859
and Merchandise Marks Act No 4 of 1889 were controlled by the UK.
When India sought to reform its copyright laws, first in 1876 and again
in 1885, even though the Government of India had modeled its proposal
on a bill drafted in Britain (by Lord John Manners), India was asked not
to take action until Britain had been able to produce its own reforms. See
Statement of Objects and Reasons: Indian Copyright Bill 1885, from the
Gov’t of India to the Sec’y of State (5 June 1885) (IOL, L/PJ/6/156, file
1137, para. 1). See Lionel Bently, ‘The “Extraordinary Multiplicity” of
Intellectual Property Laws in the British Colonies in the Nineteenth
Century’ 12 (1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 179 (2011).
26 Singapore’s Copyright Act of 1911 was enacted by the Parliament of
the UK. Until the second half of the 1980s, Singapore had no IP system
of its own. Before 1992, although trademarks could be directly registered
in Singapore, trademarks were still protected by the registrations system
under the UK Trade Marks Act of 1938. Before 2014, patent applications
in Singapore needed to be registered in the UK first and then re-registered
in Singapore with no independent examination. See Christoph Antons,
‘Intellectual property law in Southeast Asia: recent legislative and institu-
tional developments’ 1 (1) Journal of Information, Law and Technology
1-11 (2006); Alisha Gill, Zsuzsanna Vari-Kovacs and Ashish Lall, Lee
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, ‘The Development of Singapore’s
Intellectual Property Rights Regime’ (Microsoft Case Studies Series on
Information Technology, Public Policy and Society 2014) 7; Ng Siew
Kuan, ‘Intellectual Property Law in Singapore: A General Overview’
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 1992, 32-34.
27 The first provision on IP in the Dutch East Indies (now part of
Indonesia) was introduced by the Dutch in 1844 No 28. The first Patent
Act in Netherlands East Indies was introduced on the basis of the Dutch
legislation of 1910. See Christoph Antons, ‘Indonesia’ in Christopher
Health (ed), Intellectual Property Law in Asia (Kluwer Law International
2003) 391, 395-396.
28 For example, the 1902 Mackay Treaty with the United Kingdom
(《续议通商行船条约》) required the Chinese government to protect
trademarks. As a result, the Chinese government in the late Qing
Dynasty promulgated Interim Provisions on Registration of Trademarks
(《商标注册试办章程》in 1904.
29 The US established the ‘Special 301’ provisions through the Trade Act
of 1974 and Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which
empower the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
prepare a Special 301 Report annually to identify countries denying US
companies adequate IP protection. ‘From the mid-1980s onwards, the US
in particular used this to put pressure on countries to better reorganise in-
tellectual property rights.’ Christoph Antons, ‘Specialised intellectual
property courts in Southeast Asia’ in Annette Kur, Stefan Luginb€uhl and
Eskil Waage (eds), “. . .und sie bewegt sich doch! – Patent Law on the
Move (Carl Heymanns 2005) 287. In 1991 and 1994, the US initiated a
Special 301 investigation against China, forcing it to strengthen legal pro-
tection for IP rights, including joining the Berne Convention, revising the
Patent Law and Trademark Law and taking measures to crack down on
IP infringements. See United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548, ‘U.S.-China Trade Implementation of
Agreements on Market Access and Intellectual Property’ <https://www.
gao.gov/products/GGD-95-61>; Peter Yu, ‘Intellectual Property,
Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in Daniel J Gervais (ed.),
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize
Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era (Oxford University Press
2007) 173. Under US pressure for IPR policy dialogue in 1994, the
Japanese government made changes to its Patent Act, which included
switching from the pre-grant opposition to the post-grant opposition sys-
tem and expanding the fast track system of patent examination to allow
an applicant with an application filed with a foreign patent office to also
enjoy fast-track status. See Sadao Nagaoka, ‘Reform of Patent System in
Japan and Challenges’ in National Research Council etc., 21st Century
Innovation Systems for Japan and the United States: Lessons from a
Decade of Change: Report of a Symposium (National Academies Press
2009) 153. Christoph Antons, ‘Intellectual Property Law in ASEAN
Countries: A Survey’ 13 (3) European Intellectual Property Review
78 (1991).
30 Japan made innovative achievements between the 1960s and 1980s,
including the first programmable desktop calculator, AL-1000, released
by Casio in 1967; the first portable self-contained video tape analogue re-
cording system, released by Sony in 1967; solid-state optical fiber,
invented by Nishizawa in 1964; etc. By the 1970s, Japan excelled in the
production of machine tools, computers and liquid crystal displays
(National Research Council, Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and
Technology Relations with Japan (The National Academies Press 1997)
33-35) and became the third largest industrial nation in the world. The
ratio of Japanese exports of technology to imports increased from 0.12 in
1971 to 0.30 in 1983. See ‘Japan in the 1950s, 60s and 70s under
Yoshida, Ikeda, Sato and Tanaka’ (Facts and Details, October 2016)
<http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat16/sub110/item524.html>.
31 Both South Korea and Taiwan have improved their capacity for tech-
nological innovation since the early 1990s. The Korean model of technol-
ogy acquisition shifted from borrowing and learning from foreign
sources to conducting indigenous R&D, and Taiwanese firms became in-
novative designers of PCs, electronic notebooks and circuit boards. See
Jenn-Hwan Wang, ‘From technological catch-up to innovation based
economic growth: South Korea and Taiwan compared’ 43 (6) Journal of
Development Studies 1084 (2007); Sungchul Chung, ‘Excelsior: The
Korean Innovation Story’ <https://issues.org/chung>; Sungchul Chung,
‘Innovation, Competitiveness and Growth: Korean Experiences’ in Justin
Yifu Lin and Boris Pleskovic (eds), Annual World Bank Conference on
Development Economics±Global 2010: Lessons from East Asia and the
Global Financial Crisis (Bernan Distribution 2011) 333; Haider Khan,
‘Technology and economic development: the case of Taiwan’ 13 (40)
Journal of Contemporary China 507-521 (2004).
32 For Hong Kong see Jacqueline Yuen, ‘HKTDC Research, Innovation
and Technology Industry in Hong Kong’ (HKTDC Research, 21 August
2019) <http://hong-kong-economy-research.hktdc.com/business-news/ar
ticle/Hong-Kong-Industry-Profiles/Innovation-and-Technology-Industry-
in-Hong-Kong/hkip/en/1/1X000000/1X09U6YK.htm>. For Singapore’s
successful transition to a developed economy in the 2000s, see Kung-
Chung Liu, ‘IPR Protection for Asian Development: Opportunities and
Challenges from GVCs and Digital Economy – Singapore’ in Lurong
Chen and others (ed), IPR Protection for Asian Development:
Opportunities and Challenges from GVCs and Digital Economy
(Routledge, forthcoming 2020); Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual
Property of Singapore (2nd edn, Sweet &Maxwell, 2014) Chapter 4.
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China33 and India34 after 2010. During the initial indus-
trialization stage, they suffered from IP rights and laws,
which meant nothing but costs and hindrances to free imi-
tation. After surviving the struggle and reaching a certain
level of economic development, these economies painstak-
ingly moved up the global value chain to strive for indige-
nous technological improvement and innovation and
started to benefit from IP rights and laws.35 They have
transformed themselves from infringers and pirates to cre-
ators and protectors of IP.
Parallel to its IP success stories, over the last 40 years
Asia has become the world’s factory and growth engine
in terms of export and intra-regional trade36 and even in-
novation.37 Asia is now also home to the world’s biggest
markets, partially fueled by its population bonus.38 With
the support of infrastructure and education, Asia’s huge
population, which once hindered ‘modernization’, has be-
come a plus rather than a minus, as it means more people
in the labor force, greater consumption, speedy economic
growth and massive networks of people and things. Asia
is also well positioned for the future, as it has the most
netizens and a fast-growing penetration rate for smart
mobile phones,39 creating a vast amount of big data that
will feed the growth of artificial intelligence.40 However,
the general lack of a functioning democracy and a weak
rule of law have profound impacts on IP regimes in Asia.
III. Some structural features of the IP landscape
in major Asian jurisdictions
IP has become a common focal point of discussion in the
major Asian economies, ironically thanks to the pressure
from the US. In this section, some features of the IP land-
scape in major Asian jurisdictions that will structurally af-
fect the future development of IP law in Asia will
be identified.
1. National IP strategy as a
common phenomenon
Led by Japan (2003),41 the major Asian economies have
adopted national IP strategies to promote the importance
and commercialization of IP. For example, China adopted
a National IP Strategy in 2008 that will last until 2020
(an extension program to 2035 is now being worked
out).42 Korea has launched two Master Plans for
National IP (2012-2016, 2017-2021),43 followed by
Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Strategy (2012).44
Singapore issued an IP Master Plan (2013, updated in
2017),45 Cambodia adopted a National IP Strategy
(2013-2023, with 6 key sectors and 41 initiatives)46 and
India introduced its National IPR Policy in 2016.47 The
Thai government established a National IP Policy
Committee in 2009 and published a 20-year IP Roadmap
in 2017.48 Japan has institutionalized its national IP strat-
egy by enacting the IP Basic Act (2002),49 which was
33 Since it opened up in 1982, China has transformed into the largest
manufacturing economy and goods exporter. See Bruce McKern, ‘Made
in China: three ways Chinese business has evolved from imitation to
innovation’ (The Conversation, 26 October 2016) <http://theconversa
tion.com/made-in-china-three-ways-chinese-business-has-evolved-from-
imitation-to-innovation-67236>; Yanfei Li, ‘Understanding China’s
Technological Rise’ (The Diplomat, 3 August 2018) <https://thediplo
mat.com/2018/08/understanding-chinas-technological-rise>; WIPO,
‘Global Innovation Index 2018: China Cracks Top 20. Top Rankings:
Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Singapore, U.S.’ (WIPO, 10 July
2018) <https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_
0005.html>.
34 With the advantages of low labor costs, policy support and English
language skills, India has also achieved economic success in the services
export sector, business software, etc. after 2000. See generally Kung-
Chung Liu and Uday Racherla (eds), Innovation, Economic
Development, and Intellectual Property in India and China – Comparing
Six Economic Sectors (Springer 2019). India is now developing innova-
tion in fields such as pharmaceutical information technology etc. See
‘Science and Technology Development in India’ <https://www.nasscom.
in/knowledge-center/publications/tech-start-ups-india-bright-future>;
Rishikesha T Krishnan Shameen Prashantham, ‘Innovation in and from
India: The who, where, what, and when’ 9 (3) Global Strategy Journal
357 (2018); Rakesh Basant and Shuchi Srinivasan, ‘Intellectual property
protection in India and implications for health innovation: emerging
perspectives’ 3 Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Health 57 (2016).
35 David Llewelyn, Invisible Gold in Asia – Creating Wealth Through
Intellectual Property (Marshall Cavendish Business 2010) provides a
convincing account of these Asian IP success stories.
36 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), Asian countries had a higher volume of
exports than countries in other continents from 2011 to 2018, and devel-
oping economies in Asia also had the highest volume of exports com-
pared with developing economies in other continents (see <https://
unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx>).
37 This should not come as a surprise, as Asia is the birthplace of Indian,
Chinese and Buddhist civilizations (see Masakazu Yamazaki, ‘Asia, a
Civilization in the Making’ 75 (4) Foreign Affairs 106 (1996)) as well as
some fundamental innovations, such as paper making, printing
and explosives.
38 In stark contrast to the dire aging issue in North East Asia, such as
China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the median age in India between 2015
and 2019 ranged from 29.5 to 30.5; see ‘Population Data Online’
<https://www.populationof.net/india>.
39 As of 30 June 2019, Asia has 2,200,658,148 internet users, account-
ing for 49.8% of global internet users. See <https://internetworldstats.
com/stats.htm>.
40 According to Kai-Fu Lee, data are the key to the age of AI implemen-
tation, and China is the ‘Saudi Arabia of data.’ See Kai-Fu Lee, AI
Superpowers – China, Silicon Valley and the New World Order (2018)
14 and 55.
41 Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters, ‘Strategic Program for the
Creation, Protection and Exploitation of Intellectual Property’ (Kantei, 8
July 2003) <https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/titeki/kettei/030708f_e.
html>. In 2002, the Government of Japan set up the Strategic Council on
Intellectual Property; since then it has published Intellectual Property
Policy Outlines and an annual Intellectual Property Strategic Program.
See Japan Patent Office, ‘National IP Strategies for Innovation –
Experience of Japan’ <https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/aspac/en/
wipo_reg_ip_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sin_14_t3_a.pdf>.
42 The State Council of the PRC, ‘Outline of the National Intellectual
Property Strategy’ (Cm Guofa No 18, 2008); The National Intellectual
Property Administration made the announcement on 25 April 2019
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2019-04/26/c_1124417690.htm>.
43 Korean Presidential Council on Intellectual Property, First Master
Plan for National Intellectual Property (2012-2016) and Second Master
Plan for the National Intellectual Property (2017-2021) <http://www.
ipkorea.go.kr/frontEn/strategic_plan/strategic_plan.do>.
44 Taiwan Executive Yuan, ‘Intellectual Property Strategy’ (《智財戰略
綱領》) <https://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/doit/content/Content.aspx?
menu_id¼13453>.
45 Government of Singapore and Intellectual Property Office of
Singapore, ‘Update to the Intellectual Property Hub Master Plan’ (2017)
<https://www.ipos.gov.sg/docs/default-source/about-ipos-doc/full-re
port_update-to-ip-hub-master-plan_final.pdf>.
46 Cambodian Framework of the Draft National IP Strategy <https://
www.moc.gov.kh/tradeswap/userfiles/file/uploadedfiles/Job/9.IPStrategy-
DetailsObjectives-Initiatives-Final5_21_2013_1_50_54.pdf>.
47 Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ‘National Intellectual
Property Rights Policy 2016’ <https://dipp.gov.in/policies-rules-and-acts/
policies/national-ipr-policy>.
48 IBP Inc., Thailand: Doing Business and Investing in Thailand Guide
Volume 1— Strategic, Practical Information and Contacts (Int'l Business
Publications 2015) 61; ‘Intellectual Property Roadmap for Thailand’
<https://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?
nid¼4480&filename¼index>; Daniel Greif and Dhanasun Chumchuay,
‘Thailand: 20-Year IP Roadmap Published’ (Managing Intellectual
Property, 28 April 2017) <https://www.managingip.com/Article/
3714893/Thailand-20-year-IP-Roadmap-published.html?ArticleId¼371
4893>.
49 Japanese IP Basic Act (Act No 122 of 2002) <https://www.cas.go.jp/
jp/seisaku/hourei/data/ipba.pdf>.
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followed by the Korean Framework Act on IP,50 a move
China is contemplating following.51
Most of these national IP strategies have been driven
from the top down. Article 24 of the Japanese IP Basic
Act provides:
‘In order to promote measures for the creation, pro-
tection and exploitation of intellectual property in a
focused and systematic manner, the Intellectual
Property Strategy Headquarters shall be established
in the Cabinet.’
The Headquarters is led by the director-general, which is
a post occupied by none other than the prime minister
himself (Art. 27 of Japanese IP Basic Act).
2. Driven by statutory laws drafted by IP
technocrats
One can reasonably conclude from this that the develop-
ment of IP laws in Asia is driven by IP technocrats in
trade and/or industry ministries and IP offices, and the
common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and Hong
Kong, are no exception.52 This may be the result of the
lack of an active and functioning democracy. However,
career IP technocrats are constantly subjected to pressure
from special interest and lobby groups in Asia. This has
obvious downsides. A consequence is that the same issue
is unevenly regulated across different areas of IP law
(such as exhaustion, fair use and compulsory licensing)
and the public interest in optimizing IP regimes to suit
varying developmental needs has often been compro-
mised or even sacrificed as a trade-off for other interna-
tional trade considerations. IP rights trump all other
rights, sometimes even basic human rights and con-
sumer protection.
3. Specialized IP judges, chambers or courts
It is no exaggeration to say that Asia has the world’s larg-
est number of specialized IP judges and courts. In 1950,
Japan set up a Special Division of the Tokyo High Court
(renamed the IP High Court in 2005) to handle patent in-
fringement cases and appeals against decisions made by
the Japan Patent Office (JPO).53 For first-instance in-
fringement lawsuits relating to technical IP (patents, util-
ity models, computer programs, etc.), Tokyo and Osaka
district courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. Thailand set
up the Central IP and International Trade Court in
1996.54 Korea established the Patent Court in 199855 and
in 2018 allowed international panels to be set up at
the Patent Court and the five designated District Courts
(i.e.Seoul Central, Daejeon, Daegu, Busan and Gwangju)
for IP disputes (i.e. patent, utility model, design, trade-
mark and plant variety cases). Before the international
panel, parties may present evidence and arguments in an
agreed-upon foreign language, and the court will issue its
decision in Korean first and then translate it into that for-
eign language.56 Indonesia authorized its Commercial
Court to try civil cases related to IP rights in 2000.57 The
Philippines founded its Special Commercial Courts
in 2003.58
In 2007, Malaysia designated six High Courts to adju-
dicate IP civil cases and criminal appeals against decisions
from 15 Sessions Courts, which deal with only IP criminal
cases.59 Taiwan set up a stand-alone IP Court in 2008
that deals with civil, criminal and administrative IP-
related cases (so-called three-in-one). It acts both as the
first instance for civil and administrative cases and the
second instance for civil and criminal cases (so-called
two-in-one capacity).60 Singapore created its Singapore
International Commercial Court (SICC) in 2015, with in-
ternational judges (including an IP specialist, Judge
Thorley from the UK) sitting on the bench.61 India’s
Commercial Courts Act of 2015 set up divisions in the
High Courts to deal with IP disputes where the value
exceeds INR 1 crore.62 In China, three IP Courts of inter-
mediate level were set up in Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou in 2014.63 To further strengthen the protec-
tion of IP, the Supreme People’s Court set up a centralized
IP court in 2019 to exclusively handle appeals against
decisions on patent, antitrust and unfair competition
50 Korean Framework Act on IP <http://www.ipkorea.go.kr/frontEn/ip_
framework/ip_framework.do>.
51 According to a report by IPRdaily on 4 June 2019, the draft of the IP
Basic Act has been tabled in China; see <http://www.iprdaily.cn/news_
21874.html>.
52 Heath (n 24) 305.
53 The Tokyo High Court established the 5th Special Division in
November 1950, specializing in appeals against decisions made by JPO
and district courts on IP issues. Subsequently, instead of assigning all IP
cases exclusively to the 5th Special Division, four of the civil divisions of
the Tokyo High Court were designated as divisions specializing in IP
cases. In 2004, the specialized divisions were named ‘Intellectual
Property Divisions’ (1st to 4th). For a history of the IP High Court, see
<http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/history/index.html>.
54 In 1996, Thailand passed the Act on the Establishment of and
Procedure for IP and International Trade Court, which established its
Central IP and International Trade Court. The Court has exclusive juris-
diction over IP matters, covering not only trademarks, copyright and pat-
ents but also layout designs of integrated circuits, trade names,
geographical indications, trade secrets and plant varieties. The Court tries
both civil and criminal cases. See Vichai Ariyanuntaka, ‘TRIPS and the
Specialised Intellectual Property Court in Thailand’ 30 (4) IIC 360-376
(1999); Antons (n 29) 287.
55 The Patent Court of Korea was established under art 3(1) of the
Court Organization Act on 1 March 1998. Since January 2016, the
Patent Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all civil actions re-
lating to IP rights, in addition to patent validity cases; see <https://patent.
scourt.go.kr/patent_new/index_e.work>.
56 Kim & Chang Intellectual Property, ‘New "International Panel" To
Be Established in the Korean Courts’ (IP Newsletter, Winter 2017/2018)
<https://www.kimchang.com/newsletter/2018newsletter/ip/eng/html/
newsletter_ip_en_winter2018_article04.html>.
57 However, criminal cases remain within the jurisdiction of the general
courts. Furthermore, the Plant Varieties Act (Law No 29 of 2000) and
the Trade Secrets Act (Law No 30 of 2000) are under the civil jurisdiction
of the general district courts of first instance. See Antons (n 29) 287.
58 Republic of the Philippines, Supreme Court, Re: Consolidation of
Intellectual Property Courts with Commercial Courts Resolution (Cm A.
M. NO. 03-03-03-SC, 2003) stipulated that all IP cases shall be trans-
ferred to the designated Special Commercial Courts except those which
have undergone the pre-trial stage in civil cases or those where any of the
accused has been arraigned in criminal cases.
59 Fifteen Sessions Courts with criminal jurisdiction, one in each state,
including Putrajaya. However, under the Patents Act of 1983, the Session
Courts have no jurisdiction in relation to patent infringement or invalida-
tion matters. Only the High Court has such jurisdiction. Six High Courts
with civil and appellate jurisdictions were established in Kuala Lumpur,
Selangor, Johor, Perak, Sabah and Sarawak. These High Courts exercise
jurisdiction over all IP matters, not being restricted to patents only.
OECD, ‘Boosting Malaysias National Intellectual Property System for
Innovation’ (OECD 2015) 84.
60 See introduction of Taiwan Intellectual Property Court at <http://ipc.
judicial.gov.tw/ipr_english>.
61 See introduction of SICC at <https://www.sicc.gov.sg/about-
the-sicc>.
62 The Indian Commercial Courts Act [2015] ch I s 2 (c) (xvii), s 2 (i).
63 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Jurisdiction of the
Intellectual Property Courts of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou over
Cases (Cm 12, 2014) <http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?
id¼18117&lib¼law>.
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cases by intermediate courts, including the three
IP Courts.64
IV. Some distinctively Asian IP developments
The section will highlight five distinctively Asian IP
developments.
1. Sweeping criminalization of copyright
infringement
In Asia, there is clearly an issue of overusing penal pun-
ishment for copyright infringement, even though Art. 61
of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement only requires members to pro-
vide criminal penalties for willful trademark counterfeit-
ing or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.65 In
Taiwan, for example, copyright infringement, whether
for profit or not, can result in up to three years’ imprison-
ment,66 whereas manslaughter is subject only to two
years’ imprisonment.67 On average, criminal cases against
copyright infringement exceed civil cases by 300% in
Taiwan.68 Japan is similar and imposes even heavier pun-
ishment for copyright infringement: imprisonment of up
to 10 years, a fine of up to 10 million yen, or both.69
Singapore, since its independence in 1965, has used incar-
ceration as a means to deter copyright infringement. To
implement its obligations under the 2003 US-Singapore
Free Trade Agreement, Singapore added a new Sec. 136
(3A) to its Copyright (Amendment) Act of 200470 to fur-
ther expand the scope of the copyright offences by crimi-
nalizing willful copyright infringement where the extent
of infringement is significant and/or where the person
does the act to obtain a commercial advantage.71
In Malaysia, criminal punishment for copyright
infringements has been a standard component of its copy-
right regime for more than five decades.72 Malaysia
effectively criminalizes the possession of even a single in-
fringing copy not for private and domestic use, with the
rebuttable presumption of knowledge of the copyright-
infringing nature of possession.73 In India, to target film
pirates, some states have expanded laws stipulating pre-
ventive detention without trial, meant to curb serious
crimes, known as ‘Goonda Acts’ (referring to violent
criminals).74 In 2005, the Tamil Nadu police detained a
commercial film pirate under the state’s Goonda Act. The
Madras High Court upheld such use in a decision by
Justice Palanisamy Sathasivam, who later became the
Chief Justice of India.75
In addition, criminal sanctions against P2P file sharing
have spread in Asia. In 2007, the Korean Supreme Court
held that downloading an MP3 file via a P2P file-sharing
protocol constituted a fixing on a tangible object and a re-
production under the Copyright Act. The operators of
Soribada, which provided a P2P file-sharing service
allowing users to make unauthorized reproductions, were
held criminally liable for having aided and abetted users’
copyright infringements.76 The Supreme Court of Japan
also held in a 2011 case that providing software consti-
tutes being an accessory when there is a high probability
that it will be used to infringe copyright and the provider
perceives and accepts that probability.77
However, criminal sanctions are only suitable for
crimes that are clearly identifiable from the outset. In the
realm of copyright, there is no public notice mechanism,
and the boundary between what is legitimate use and
what is copyright infringement is often unclear. Only in-
tentional and slavish copying of another’s works and pi-
rating for commercial gains (blatant piracy) seem to
deserve criminal punishment. In addition, the overuse of
penal punishment has a tendency to blur and confuse civil
issues on contributory (indirect) infringement and joint
infringement with the criminal law issues of aiding and
abetting and what constitutes an accomplice. The deter-
mination of aiding, abetting and accomplice under crimi-
nal law sometimes even replaces discussion of
contributory (indirect) infringement.78
As a reminder of the rampant criminalization of
copyright-related behavior, we also draw attention to the
still valid but already obsolete criminal provisions related
to optical disk manufacturing, a product long overtaken
by streaming via the cloud, which was the result of US
64 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning
the Intellectual Property Tribunal (Cm 22, 2018) <https://cgc.law.stan
ford.edu/belt-and-road/b-and-r-texts/20180701-provisions-re-intl-com
mercial-courts>.
65 Article 61 TRIPS stipulates: ‘members shall provide for criminal pro-
cedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. . . Members
may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where
they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.’
66 Article 91, Taiwanese Copyright Act.
67 Article 271, Taiwanese Criminal Act provides: ‘Whoever commits
murder shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term im-
prisonment of not less than 10 years. Any attempt mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph shall be punished. Whoever is prepared to commit the
crime mentioned in the first sentence shall be sentenced to fixed-term im-
prisonment of not more than 2 years.’
68 Kung-Chung Liu, Min-Yang Shieh and Jerry Fong, ‘Empirical Study
on Copyright Decisions of the Taiwan IP Court between 2009-2011’ (in
Chinese) Taiwan Law Journal No 203 (April 2012) 47-62.
69 Article 119(1) of the Japanese Copyright Act provides: ‘A person that
infringes a copyright, print rights, or neighboring rights (other than one
that personally reproduces a work or performance, etc. for the purpose
of private use as referred to in Article 30, paragraph (1). . .) is subject to
imprisonment for a term of up to ten years, a fine of up to ten million
yen, or both.’
70 No 52 of 2004.
71 Ng-Loy Wee Loon, ‘The Criminal Offense of Wilful Copyright
Infringement Where the Extent is Significant or Where a Commercial
Advantage is Obtained’ in Kung-Chung Liu (ed), Annotated Leading
Copyright Cases in Major Asian Jurisdictions (City University of Hong
Kong Press 2019) 154-170.
72 The Malaysian Copyright Act of 1969 first applied criminal enforce-
ment measures in s 15 and criminalized traditional offenses such as the
sale, distribution and possession of infringing copies. Ainee Adam, ‘The
Crime of Possessing Infringing Copies Not for Private and Domestic Use
in Malaysia’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 172.
73 Section 41(1)(d) of the Malaysian Copyright Act provides: ‘Any per-
son who during the subsistence of copyright in a work . . . possesses, oth-
erwise than for his private and domestic use, any infringing copy . . .
shall, unless he is able to prove that he had acted in good faith and had
no reasonable grounds for supposing that copyright . . . would or might
thereby be infringed, be guilty of an offence. Section 41(2) clarifies what
is “private and domestic use”: the possession, custody or control of three
or more infringing copies of a work or recording in the same form shall,
unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be in possession of . . . such
copies otherwise than for private and domestic use.’
74 Arpan Banerjee, ‘Preventive Detention and Criminal Copyright
Enforcement in India’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 184, 185.
75 Madras High Court, Siva v. Commissioner, Indlaw MAD 199 (24
June 2005).
76 Sang Jo Jong, ‘Criminal Sanctions Against P2P File Sharing Service in
Korea’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 198-211.
77 Takeshi Maeda, ‘Requirements for Criminal Accessoryship Liability
for Copyright Infringement through Release of a File-sharing Software
Program in Japan’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 212-226.
78 Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Chapter 1 Introduction Copyright Laws and Cases
in Major Asian Jurisdictions’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 9.
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pressure. Manufacturing without a license or registration
with the authorities or contrary to the terms of a license
or registration; exporting disks or importing/exporting
production parts, raw materials or machinery without a
license or contrary to the terms of a license; forging li-
cense documents; manufacturing/producing disks at a
place other than the licensed or registered premises; and
failing to apply the required allocated identification code
may lead to criminal penalties in South Korea,79
Taiwan,80 Singapore,81 Thailand,82 Malaysia83 and
Hong Kong.84
2. Explosion in the number of
registered trademarks
It is striking that the trademark landscape in Asia has un-
dergone a sea change, at least since this article’s first au-
thor edited and published ‘The Protection of Well-Known
Marks in Asia’ in 2000.85 Who could have imagined back
then that China would have a staggering 5.7 million an-
nual trademark applications in 2017 (a 55.7% increase
compared with 2016), 62.5% of the total for the rest of
the world,86 and 14.92 million validly registered trade-
marks by the end of 2017?87
This explosion can also be observed in Macau88 and
the city-state of Singapore – in both, the number of trade-
marks per 1 million population is even higher than in
China.89 India has shown a similar fervor, with the num-
ber of registered trademarks shooting up almost fivefold
between 2013 (67,796) and 2017 (300,913).90 Growing
interest in trademarks can be observed in other major
Asian economies, such as Japan91 and Malaysia,92 with
only Korea experiencing a slight decrease in the number
of registered trademarks from 2016 to 2018.93
Worth exploring are the following questions: Will the
sheer number of trademarks become a serious issue?
Should we try to counter-balance the social waste in-
volved in the application, examination, publication, op-
position and invalidation of trademarks which will never
be commercially used? Will trademarks become land-
mines or an entry barrier for latecomers in Asia?
3. Extremely restrained use of
compulsory licensing
It is often feared by patent holders that the recognition of
compulsory licensing in patent law will automatically
lead to its overuse or abuse. However, this has not been
the case in Asia at all. Asian jurisdictions have been ex-
tremely restrained in their use of such licenses. To date,
the total number of issued compulsory patent licenses is a
mere 14. Only two are technology-related94 and the other
12 are pharmaceutical-related. The Philippines issued its
first and only compulsory patent license in 1965, which
was upheld by the Supreme Court.95 Malaysia was the
first Asian country, following the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health, to issue a government-use li-
cense for public health purposes (HIV/AIDS, 2003); it
was not challenged and the royalty has not been col-
lected.96 Malaysia issued the second compulsory license
in 2017 for a ground-breaking hepatitis C medicine to
treat as many as 500,000 people, or 2.5% of the general
population.97 Thailand has issued the largest number of
compulsory patent licenses, seven in total, against phar-
maceutical product patents between 2006 and 2008,
79 In South Korea, violation of the Music Industry Promotion Act can
lead to imprisonment of up to two years or a fine not exceeding 20 mil-
lion won according to arts 26 and 34 of the Music Industry
Promotion Act.
80 According to arts 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16, Taiwanese Optical
Disk Act, any violation may lead to imprisonment of up to three years
and a fine of up to NT$ 6,000,000.
81 In Singapore, violation of the Manufacture of Optical Discs Act can
lead to a fine not exceeding S$ 200,000 or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years or both according to s 22 of the Manufacture of
Optical Discs Act of 2004 (revised in 2005).
82 In Thailand, any violation can lead to imprisonment for up to five
years and/or a fine according to s 29, Thai Manufacture of Optical Discs
Act B.E. 2548.
83 In Malaysia, any violation can lead to imprisonment of up to three
years or fine; for repeated offence, the imprisonment can be increased to
six years according to s 26, Malaysian Optical Discs Act of 2000.
84 In Hong Kong, the punishment for violation is subject to imprison-
ment for up to four years and a fine. See ss 35 (6A) (6B), 118, and 119,
Hong Kong’s Cap. 528 Copyright Ordinance; s 21, Hong Kong’s Cap.
544 Prevention of Copyright Piracy Ordinance.
85 Christopher Heath and Kung-Chung Liu (eds), The Protection of
Well-Known Marks in Asia (Kluwer International Law 2000).
86 There were 9.11 million trademark applications worldwide in 2017,
according to WIPO, ‘World Intellectual Property Indicators: Filings for
Patents, Trademarks, Industrial Designs Reach New Records on Strength
in China’ <https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_
0012.html>.
87 ‘China's trademark applications hit record high in 2017’
(XINHUANET, 20 January 2018) <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
2018-01/20/c_136911172.htm>.
88 In Macau, since the total number of trademark applications reached
10,000 in 2013, the number has been on the rise: 10,084 in 2013,
12,287 in 2014, 13,140 in 2015, 11,507 in 2016, 13,135 in 2017,
16,474 in 2018. See <https://www.economia.gov.mo/en_US/web/public/
pg_ip_sd>.
89 In Singapore, there were 50,218 registered trademarks (9,224 owned
by Singaporeans and 40,994 by foreigners) in 2015, 53,000 (10,432
owned by Singaporeans and 42,568 by foreigners) in 2016 and 37,030
(8,595 owned by Singaporeans and 28,435 by foreigners) in 2017. See
<https://www.ipos.gov.sg/who-we-are/statistics>.
90 In India, the number of registered trademarks in India has increased
as follows: 67,796 in 2013, 41,583 in 2014, 65,045 in 2015, 250,070 in
2016, 300,913 in 2017. See the Office of the Controller General of
Patents, Designs, Trademarks and Geographical Indications, Annual
Report <http://www.ipindia.nic.in/annual-reports-ipo.htm>.
91 There was a double-digit rise in registered trademarks in Japan from
2014 to 2018: 99,896 in 2014, 98,085 in 2015, 105,207 in 2016,
111,180 in 2017, 116,547 in 2018. See <https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/resour
ces/statistics/syutugan_toukei_sokuho/index.html>.
92 There was also a double-digit rise in registered trademarks in
Malaysia from 2012 to 2018: 26,979 in 2013, 27,428 in 2014, 28,800 in
2015, 32,806 in 2016, 33,225 in 2017, 34,566 in 2018. See <http://
www.myipo.gov.my/en/statistic-application-registration/#toggle-id-2>.
93 The number of trademark applications in Korea has been increasing:
147,667 in 2013, 150,226 in 2014, 185,443 in 2015, 170,347 in 2016,
168,556 in 2017, 185,968 in 2018. However, the number of registered
trademarks decreased slightly in the last three years: 100,093 in 2013,
99,791 in 2014, 114,746 in 2015, 119,255 in 2016, 116,704 in 2017,
115,025 in 2018. See <https://www.kipo.go.kr/en/HtmlApp?
c¼60114&catmenu¼ek07_01_01_15>.
94 Taiwan is the only Asian jurisdiction that issued two compulsory pat-
ent licenses for technology products, in addition to issuing one such for
avian flu vaccine (Tamiflu, 2005, no royalty designated and never put
into practice). One was against a chemical fertilizer patent in 1981. The
other was against five CD-R-related patents held by Philips in 2004,
which was later annulled by the Taiwan IP Office (TIPO) due to the fact
that the need for such a compulsory license ceased to exist. For more, see
Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Compulsory License and Government Use in Taiwan
– A Regress’ in Kung-Chung Liu and Reto M Hilty (eds), Compulsory
Licensing – Practical Experiences and Ways Forward (Springer 2015)
79-93.
95 Parke, Davis & Company v Doctors’ Pharmaceutical, Inc., et al.
[965] G.R. NO. L-22221.
96 Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Introduction: Asian IP Landscape and Patent
Features’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 8.
97 Catherine Saez, ‘Intellectual Property Watch, Malaysia Grants
Compulsory Licence for Generic Sofosbuvir Despite Gilead Licence’
(Intellectual Property Watch 2017) <https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/09/
15/malaysia-grants-compulsory-licence-generic-sofosbuvir-despite-gil
ead-licence>.
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which again were not challenged.98 India issued its one
and only compulsory patent license in 2012 against Bayer
(a drug for kidney and liver cancer). This was challenged
by the patentee but upheld by the Supreme Court.99
It is very difficult to conclude that pharmaceutical com-
panies in general have been adversely affected to a notice-
able extent by compulsory licensing in Asia. In the
Philippines in the 1960s, the company Parke-Davis
remained largely unaffected during and after the period
of granting the compulsory license. The issuance of the
compulsory license did not cause big pharma companies
to leave India; to the contrary, they streamed in by merg-
ing with local generic companies.100 Rather, the long-
term increase in the demand and consumption of medici-
nal and pharmaceutical products induced by a growing
population and the number of hospitals are the most deci-
sive reason for big pharma companies to remain in any
given Asian market.
4. The exercise of IP rights
a) Exemption from competition laws
Ever since the inception of their competition laws either
after WWII (Japan) or in the 1990s, major Asian econo-
mies have had specific legislative provisions exempting
the exercise of IP rights from the scrutiny of competition
law (unlike the EU and US model, which lacks such a spe-
cific legislative provision). Article 21 of the Japanese
Anti-Monopolization Act goes the furthest in this regard
by providing an unconditional exemption: ‘The provi-
sions of this Act shall not apply to such acts recognizable
as the exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, Patent
Act, Utility Model Act, Design Act or Trademark Act.’
The South Korean equivalent follows this verbatim.101
On the other hand, Taiwan102 and India103 provide a
vague conditional exemption. China’s Antimonopoly Act
of 2008 is clearer in delineating a conditional exemption.
Article 55 provides:
‘This Law does not govern the conduct of business
operators to exercise their intellectual property
rights under laws and relevant administrative regu-
lations on intellectual property rights; however,
business operators’ conduct to eliminate or restrict
market competition by abusing their intellectual
property rights shall be governed by this Law.’
However, given that IP law is part of the broader compe-
tition law, the exercise of IPRs is only allowable in ways
that are compatible with competition law. Its (at least
nominally) ‘unconditional’ exemption in Japanese and
Korean antitrust law is clearly incorrect and not followed
in practice.104 As a restatement of a self-evident legal po-
sition, the vague conditional exemption of the exercise of
IPRs by Taiwan and India can only lead to misconcep-
tions and confusion. It is recommended that all four juris-
dictions delete their respective provisions and follow the
latecomer to antitrust law in Asia, namely China, as it has
struck the most sensible balance by pointing out that
there will be no exemption if IP is abused to eliminate or
restrict market competition.
b) Some standards on FRAND licensing of SEPs
The issue of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs), a
subset of the exercise of IPRs, is of particular importance
for Asian economies, as they are standard-takers and
SEP-implementers rather than standard-setters. To date,
certain standards on FRAND licensing of SEPs have con-
verged in major Asian jurisdictions such as Japan, Korea,
China, Taiwan and India. These can be summarized as
three ‘nos’ and one ‘yes’.
The first ‘no’ is a ‘no to bundling non-SEPs with SEPs’.
Competition authorities in Korea (Qualcomm II), China
(NDRC v Qualcomm), Japan and Taiwan have all black-
listed ‘the compelling of the licensee to purchase, accept
or use patents or technical know-how that he does not
need’. Specifically, these jurisdictions make illegal per se
the bundling of licenses of SEPs with those of non-SEPs
by SEP holders which have dominant market power.
The second ‘no’ is ‘no to continual payment of royalties
after the expiration of SEPs’. A natural consequence of
the first ‘no’ is that once patents, whether SEPs or non-
SEPs, expire, the licensees should not be required to con-
tinue paying royalties for them. The competition authori-
ties in Korea (Qualcomm I), China (NDRC v
Qualcomm) and Taiwan (Philips CD-R) have taken this
position. In addition, competition authorities in Japan
(Qualcomm), Korea (Microsoft/Nokia, Qualcomm II)
and China (NDRC v Qualcomm) have said a clear ‘no’ to
royalty-free cross-licensing. The one ‘yes’ is that competi-
tion authorities in Korea, China (NDRC v Qualcomm)
and Taiwan (Philips CD-R) demand that SEP holders
provide a patent list when negotiating licensing agree-
ments with willing licensees.105
5. Mixed fate of a general fair use clause
In Asia, an open-ended and general fair use clause has
had a mixed reception in copyright and trademark law in
the major jurisdictions.
98 Weerawit Weeraworawit, ‘Seven Compulsory Licenses on
Pharmaceutical Product Patents’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 115-121.
99 MANU/MH/0986/2014 (15 July 2014).
100 The protection of product patents for pharmaceutical inventions
since 2005 and the opening up of the pharmaceutical industry to foreign
direct investment in 2002 have led many multinational corporations to
acquire or merge with domestic Indian companies. Yugank Goyal,
‘Economic and Procedural Constraints of Compulsory Licenses for
Medicines’ in Kung-Chung Liu and Reto M Hilty (n 94) 452.
101 Article 59 of the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
provides: ‘The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any act deemed to
be a justifiable exercise of rights under the Copyright Act, Patent Act,
Utility Models Act, Design Act, or Trademark Act.’
102 Article 45 of Taiwan’s Fair Trade Act provides: ‘No provision of this
Act shall apply to any proper conduct in connection with the exercise of
rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act, Trademark Act,
or Patent Act’ (emphasis by the authors).
103 Section 3(5) of the Indian Competition Act (2002) stipulates:
‘Nothing contained in this section shall restrict – (i) the right of any per-
son to restrain any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions,
as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which have been or
may be conferred upon him under (a) the Copyright Act; (b) the Patents
Act; (c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, or the Trade Marks Act;
(d) the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection)
Act; (e) the Designs Act; (f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits
Layout-Design Act’ (emphasis by the authors).
104 For more see Kung-Chung Liu, ‘A More Economic and Cross-
Jurisdiction Study on Patent Pools’ 7 (1) NTU Law Review (March
2012) 49-90.
105 Kung-Chung Liu, ‘As a Matter of Standard for Asia and Beyond?’ in
Kung-Chung Liu and Reto M Hilty (eds.), SEPs, SSOs and FRAND –
Asian and Global Perspectives on Fostering Innovation in
Interconnectivity (Routledge forthcoming 2020) 7-8.
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a) Gradual adoption in copyright law
The mechanism of a general fair use clause modeled on
the US Copyright Act (Sec. 107) as a defense to copyright
infringement has been gradually adopted by major Asian
economies. Jurisdictions with a civil law tradition, such as
Korea and Taiwan, have transplanted this mechanism
into their copyright law. In these two economies, we ob-
serve that the general fair use clause is used tentatively,
not yet as a functional safety valve that actively balances
conflicting interests.106
Singapore, as a common law jurisdiction, introduced a
similar general fair use clause into its Copyright Act due
to the 2003 US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, how-
ever with the addition of a local factor: ‘the possibility of
obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable
time at an ordinary commercial price’ (Sec. 35(2)(e)).107
As of 2019, Japan has adopted a purpose-limited gen-
eral fair use clause in its Copyright Act to enable ma-
chine learning:
‘It is permissible to exploit work, in any way and to
the extent considered necessary, in any of the fol-
lowing cases or other cases where such exploitation
is not for enjoying or causing another person to en-
joy the ideas or emotions expressed in such work;
provided, however that this does not apply if the ex-
ploitation would unreasonably prejudice the inter-
ests of the copyright owner in light of the natures
and purposes of such work, as well as the circum-
stances of such exploitation:
i. exploitation for using the work in experiments
for the development or practical realization of
technologies concerning the recording of sounds
and visuals or other exploitations of such work;
ii. exploitation for using the work in a data analysis
(meaning the extraction, comparison, classifica-
tion, or other statistical analysis of language,
sound, or image data, or other elements of which
a large number of works or a large volume of
data is composed; the same applies in Article 47-
5, paragraph (1), item (ii));
iii. in addition to the cases set forth in the preceding
two items, exploitation for using the work in the
course of computer data processing or otherwise
that does not involve perceiving the expressions
in such work through the human sense (in regard
of works of computer programming, the execu-
tion of such work on a computer shall be
excluded).’ (Article 30-4).108 [emphasis added]
Copyright laws in the Philippines, Malaysia and China
do not yet include a general fair use clause. However,
Malaysia, also a member of the common law family,
adopted an open-ended list of factors to be considered
for the determination of ‘fair dealing for purposes of re-
search, private study, criticism, review or the reporting
of news or current events’ in the Copyright
(Amendment) Act of 2012 (Sec. 13(2A)). In the same
vein is Sec. 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act No. 8293). In China, Art. 22
of the Copyright Law designates 12 types of uses that
are permitted under the law. However, according to an
opinion issued by the Supreme People’s Court, judges
are required to take into consideration in copyright fair
use cases the four factors provided in Sec. 107 of the US
Copyright Act.109
b) Not widely accepted as an overarching trademark
infringement defense
We also observe that fair use as a general trademark in-
fringement defense to protect the public interest and mar-
ket competition, such as Sec. 43(c)(3) of the US Lanham
Act, is not widely accepted or used in Asia and remains
mostly an academic topic. Section 28(4) of the Singapore
Trade Marks Act does mention ‘fair use’ but only in a
narrow sense, when a comparative advertisement
is involved:
‘(4) Notwithstanding section 27, a person who uses
a registered trade mark does not infringe the trade
mark if such use – a) constitutes fair use in compar-
ative commercial advertising or promotion.’
India and Malaysia stand out from their Asian peers in
that they allow fair use (when ‘reasonably necessary’) of
trademarks by third-party manufacturers of spare parts
which are intended to be ancillary or used as an accessory
to the core goods of another party.110 In addition, provid-
ing a specific parody defense does not seem to be major
Asian economies’ cup of tea, as there are few such laws.
Only in rare reported cases has parody been successfully
accepted as a defense to trademark infringement.111
V. Important future issues for Asian IP laws
Looking forward, there are some important issues that lie
ahead in the effort to leverage IP laws as a tool for pros-
perity and peace in Asia.
1. Finding ways to enhance cooperation
across Asia
To date, there has not been much Asian IP cooperation.
The ASEAN Patent Examination Co-operation (ASPEC),
launched in 2009, is the first sub-regional program
106 For South Korea see ‘Changes Induced by Open-Ended Fair Use
Clause: Korean Experiences’ <http://opennetkorea.org/en/wp/1909?
ckattempt¼1>. For Taiwan see Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Limitations and
Exceptions in Copyright Law Across the Taiwan Strait’ in Haochen Sun,
Sham Balganesh, and Weeloon Loy (eds), Comparative Aspects of
Limitations and Exceptions in Copyright Law (Cambridge University
Press forthcoming 2020).
107 Stanley Tze Chang Lai, ‘Fair Dealing in the Digital World:
Navigating Unchartered Waters in Singapore’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71)
269-284. Peter K Yu, ‘Customizing Fair Use Transplants’ 7(1), 1-15
Laws (2018) <https://doi.org/10.3390/laws7010009>.
108 The 2016 IP Strategic Program by the IP Strategy Headquarters of
Japan proposed to consider the possibility of introducing flexible provi-
sions on copyright limitation in order to promote new innovation in the
digital network era. The Japanese Government submitted a copyright
amendment bill in the 196th ordinary Diet session on 23 February 2018.
This amendment bill was passed in the 196th ordinary Diet session in
2018 and took effect on 1 January 2019.
109 Point 8, Supreme People’s Court ‘Opinions on Some Issues
Concerning How to Sufficiently Utilize the IP Adjudication Function to
Promote the Big Development and Big Prosperity of the Socialism and
the Autonomous Coordination of the Economy’, 2011 (最高人民法院关
于充分发挥知识产权审判职能作用推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣和促
进经济自主协调发展若干问题的意见).
110 Section 30(2)(d) of the Indian Trade Marks Act and s 40(1)(e) of the
Malaysian Trade Marks Act of 1976. This follows the EU model.
111 Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Some Features of Trademark Laws and Cases in
Major Asian Jurisdictions’ in Kung-Chung Liu (n 71) 3-22.
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among ASEAN IP Offices, with nine of ten members par-
ticipating (the exception being Myanmar). The program
aims to share search and examination results between the
participating offices so as to allow applicants to obtain
patents faster and more efficiently.112 The program has
not worked out successfully so far, as it has failed to at-
tract enough applications to meet the 5% goal set for
2015. As of 14 September 2018, the total number of
requests submitted to ASPEC was only 405 (excluding
pending cases).113
There are several possible reasons. First, mutual filings
between ASPEC members are limited.114 Secondly, the
differences between ASPEC members’ patent systems and
examination standards make information from one pat-
ent examination office of limited referential value for the
other offices. Therefore, harmonization of the positive
requirements of patentability (novelty, inventive steps and
industrial applicability) seems to be the necessary first
step for regional patent cooperation.115
Actually, given the low number of patent applications
in ASEAN116 and the huge technical disparity between
Asian economies, patents might not be the most suitable
area for initiating Asian IP cooperation. By contrast,
trademarks are probably the area to go for, as they do
not require deep-pocket investment in technical capacity-
building and are less controversial than copyright, which
involves many aspects of basic fundamental rights, such
as the right to access information and the freedom of ex-
pression. In addition, the explosion in trademark applica-
tions in major Asian jurisdictions is showing no sign of
fading. It is probably worth considering an Asia
Trademark Treaty that would set up an Asian Trademark
Office and allow multiple trademark registrations across
borders via one application.
2. Steering IP regimes through trade deals/FTAs
Asian economies such as Singapore, Korea, Japan and
Vietnam are also actively pursuing more FTAs.117 Among
the results are CPTPP and RCEP, both of which have an
IP chapter. If the pre-grant oppositions and experimental
use exceptions in the leaked text of RCEP are eventually
adopted, it will be a milestone, because most international
agreements focus only on the rights of IP owners.
Safeguards against expansive patent rights like pre-grant
oppositions and the exceptions for experimental use are
almost never the subject matter of discussion at the inter-
national negotiation table. Thus, if RCEP incorporates
both these provisions it would mark the dawn of a new
age where Asia takes the lead in remolding international
patent law norms to better balance rights and
limitations.118
3. Exploring a fairer or more functional
mechanism of paying creators
Except for a few economies, such as Japan, Hong Kong
and perhaps Singapore, Asia lacks effective collective
management mechanisms to bridge the transaction gap
between rightholders and users. This again reduces the
impact of copyright regimes to ‘law on the books’ and
leads to ‘rampant piracy’ in Asia, which triggers the over-
use of criminal sanctions dealt with above. A technical so-
lution to get out of this vicious circle might be found in
the ubiquitous deployment and application of informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT), the internet
of things (IoT) and smart mobile phones in Asia, espe-
cially in China.
Mobile payment for the enjoyment of copyrighted con-
tent is at everyone’s fingertips; the speed of online delivery
of content sharply reduces its price and can therefore cur-
tail the motivation to commit copyright infringement.119
Especially in China, the uninhibited cross-platform licens-
ing of copyrighted content is facilitating the maximum
utilization of content, market competition and the genera-
tion of self-multiplying revenues. Coupled with the re-
quirement that users use their real names, the
infrastructure needed for the monetization of works and
actual re-payment (distribution) to creators is close to fru-
ition. If a fairer or more functional mechanism to pay cre-
ators can be derived from this, the copyright regime in
Asia and beyond can be very easily justified, accepted and
possibly improved upon.
4. Evaluating IP or patent judges
Thus far, no systematic study has been made of the phe-
nomenon of IP or patent judges (chambers or courts) in
Asia. What are their topology and pros and cons, and
how do they compare to specialized IP or patent judges
outside Asia (such as the German Federal Patent Court,
the IP Enterprise Court in the UK, the Boards of Appeal
of the European Patent Office, the Swiss Patent Court
and the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit)?
How should IP expertise be balanced with good common
sense? What procedural innovations can be introduced to
speed up the process? What impact will there be on sub-
stantive IP laws? Are specialized IP judges a passing or
transitional arrangement or are they here to stay? Are
there any Asian lessons for countries contemplating intro-
ducing specialist patent judges? These questions deserve
further deliberation.
112 See more at <https://www.aseanip.org/Services/ASEAN-Patent-
Examination-Co-operation-ASPEC/What-is-ASPEC>.
113 See ASPEC Statistics at <https://www.aseanip.org/Statistics/ASEAN-
Patent-Examination-Cooperation-ASPEC-Statistics>).
114 Reto M Hilty and Roberto Romandini, ‘Developing a Common
Patent System – Lessons to be Learnt from the European Experience’, in
E Siew-Kuan Ng and GW Austin (eds), International Intellectual
Property and the ASEANWay. Pathways to Interoperability (Cambridge
University Press 2017) 254 and 286.
115 Hilty and Romandini (n 114) 254 and 287.
116 Number of patent applications filed in 2015: 1395 in Thailand,
6185 in Singapore, 1178 in Indonesia, 2348 in Malaysia, 736 in the
Philippines, and 682 in Vietnam. There are no statistics for Cambodia,
Brunei and Lao PDR, which might be zero in reality. See <https://www.
wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile#C>.
117 Although India has not been able to sign a single major trade deal
since joining the WTO Agreement in 1994, Singapore has signed 22
FTAs (<https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-
singapore-companies/free-trade-agreements/ftas/overview>), Japan has
signed 18 ERA/FTAs (<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/in
dex.html>), Korea has signed 15 FTAs (<http://www.fta.go.kr/main/
situation/kfta/ov/>) and Vietnam has signed 12 FTAs (<https://www.
vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnam-free-trade-agreements-opportuni
ties-for-your-business.html/>).
118 Prashant Reddy Thikkavarapu, ‘Will RCEP Redefine Norms
Related to Pre-grant Opposition and Experimental Use Exceptions in
International Patent Law?’ in Kung-Chung Liu and Julien Chaisse (eds),
The Future of Asian Trade Deals and IP Law (Hart 2019) 160-161.
119 In China, the monthly subscription fee for unlimited online access to
thousands of movies, TV series and variety shows can cost only about
USD 2; see for example <https://www.youku.com/> and <https://film.
qq.com>.
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VI. Conclusion
In general, the major Asian jurisdictions are moving up
the global IP value chain, despite technical setbacks,
trade sanctions and IP wars. The importance of Asian IP
laws is on the rise and will demand increasing study and
investigation. In the near future, it is even foreseeable
that some features of IP regimes from Asia will be
exported to the rest of the world. Asian people and
economies should become more familiar with Asian IP
laws and leverage them as a strategic tool for stimulat-
ing prosperity and maintaining peace on this vibrant
and ever-changing continent. In this regard, the
European Patent Convention, European Patent Office
and European IP Office are models for Asia to
learn from.
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